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FRIENDLY FIRE:
THE MANDATORY MILITARY ANTHRAX
VACCINATION PROGRAM
RANDALL D. KATZ
INTRODUCTION
Your disobedience of the lawful order of a direct superior under-
mines the very essence of military good order and discipline. Your
failure to live up to these standards cannot be condoned.1
From the time he was four years old, U.S. Air Force Major Son-
nie Bates had a dream: to become a successful military pilot and serve
his country.2 By all accounts, Major Bates accomplished his goal; he
was an exceptional airman and highly decorated pilot who served his
country for fourteen years.3 He was an Air Force pilot instructor,
flight examiner, safety program manager, instructor trainer, and chief
of operations and analysis for the 436th Operations Group.4 Bates
twice was awarded the Air Force Meritorious Service Medal and the
Air Force Commendation Medal and received an Air Force
Achievement Medal.5 His military career came to an abrupt end,
Copyright © 2001 by Randall D. Katz.
1. Official Reprimand of Major Sonnie Bates, quoted in Brad Knickerbocker, An Air-
man’s Vaccination Becomes Test of Loyalty, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Feb. 2, 2000, at 1. The
author would like to sincerely thank Professor Scott Silliman, Director of the Duke University
School of Law Center on Law, Ethics and National Security, for his assistance in critiquing this
Note.
2. Id.; see also Susan Vela, Major Who Refused Vaccine Leaves Service, CINCINNATI
ENQUIRER, Mar. 31, 2000 (stating that Major Bates “lost [his] career for telling the truth”),
available at http://enquirer.com/editions/2000/03/31/loc_major_who_refused.html) (on file with
the Duke Law Journal); Biography, Majorbates.com, at http://www.majorbates.com/bio_bates1.
htm (last visited Apr. 2, 2001) (documenting Major Bates’s career in the Air Force) (on file with
the Duke Law Journal).
3. Biography, supra note 2.
4. Id.
5. Id.
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however, in March 2000. Major Bates refused to follow a direct or-
der.6 The direct order was to take the anthrax vaccine.7
There is little controversy that anthrax poses a serious threat.
Former Secretary of Defense William Cohen authorized the anthrax
vaccination program because “anthrax poses a clear and present dan-
ger to our armed forces. It is the weapon of choice for germ warfare
because it is easy to weaponize and is as lethal as the Ebola virus.”8
Anthrax is produced by the bacteria Bacillus anthracis. Contamina-
tion can occur in three ways: through the skin, by ingestion, and by
inhalation.9 Inhalation of anthrax, caused by the release of anthrax
spores into the air, poses the largest threat because spores are highly
lethal and easily manufactured.10 In fact, anthrax spores can be spread
easily over a large area and can be stored effectively for decades.11 Al-
though everyone agrees that anthrax poses a serious threat, not eve-
ryone agrees that the anthrax vaccine is a safe and effective way to
minimize that threat.
Sonnie Bates has become a symbol of the raging debate about
the legality and effectiveness of the military’s mandatory anthrax vac-
cination program (AVIP).12 Bates refused the vaccine based on his
safety concerns. In a memorandum to the Air Force explaining his
decision, Bates stated,
6. Knickerbocker, supra note 1, at 1.
7. Id.
8. Letter from William Cohen, Secretary of Defense, to Representative Christopher
Shays et al., U.S. House of Representatives (Sept. 30, 1999), quoted in FOURTH REPORT BY THE
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM TOGETHER WITH DISSENTING AND SUPPLEMENTAL
VIEWS, THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ANTHRAX VACCINE IMMUNIZATION PROGRAM:
UNPROVEN FORCE PROTECTION, H.R. DOC. NO. 106-556, at 18 (2000), available at
http://www.house.gov/reform/ns/reports/anthraxreport.pdf [hereinafter HOUSE REPORT].
9. Philip S. Brachman & Arthur M. Friedlander, Anthrax, in VACCINES 629, 629-30
(Stanley A. Plotkin & Walter A. Orenstein eds., 3d ed. 1999); see also Thomas V. Inglesby et al.,
Anthrax As a Biological Weapon: Medical and Public Health Management, 281 JAMA 1735,
1736 (1999) (describing the dangers of anthrax).
10. U.S. Dep’t of Def., Anthrax: Questions and Answers on the Threat, at http://www.
anthrax.osd.mil/Site_Files/qna/ THREAT.htm (last visited Apr. 2, 2001) [hereinafter U.S. Dep’t
of Def., Anthrax: Questions and Answers] (on file with the Duke Law Journal); U.S. Dep’t of
Def., Anthrax: The Threat, at http://www.anthrax.osd.mil/Site_Files/threat/threat_info.htm (last
visited Apr. 15, 2001) [hereinafter U.S. Dep’t of Def., Anthrax: The Threat] (on file with the
Duke Law Journal).
11. U.S. Dep’t of Def., Anthrax: The Threat, supra note 10.
12. Major Bates maintains an impressive Internet website that provides information on the
anthrax vaccination program and resources for those considering submitting to inoculation.
Majorbates.com, at http:// www.majorbates.com (last visited Apr. 2, 2001) (on file with the Duke
Law Journal).
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I believe the anthrax vaccine is unsafe. It is linked to a large number
of illnesses among people in my unit. Within a few weeks after I re-
ported for duty I became aware that approximately 5% of my
squadron were suffering from unusual illnesses that resembled those
described as Gulf War Illness. They all had two things in common;
they all had the anthrax vaccine and were healthy before receiving
the vaccine.13
Major Bates received a general discharge and lost his military pension
and retirement benefits.14 Other service members have refused the
vaccine because they believe it is unsafe, harmful, and ineffective.15
They distrust the government’s research and recommendations.16
Major Bates is believed to be one of the highest-ranking military offi-
cials to refuse the vaccine.17 More recently, Captain John Buck, an Air
Force physician, refused the anthrax vaccine.18 Captain Buck’s case is
noteworthy because he is the first military doctor to refuse the vac-
cine and because his refusal sends a message to service members.19
Secretary Cohen mandated anthrax vaccinations for the entire
U.S. military in a May 18, 1998, memorandum.20 His directive spurred
13. Memorandum from Major Sonnie G. Bates, U.S. Air Force, to Brigadier General Star-
buck, U.S. Air Force (Feb. 21, 2000), available at http://www.dallasnw.quik.com/cyberella/
Anthrax/Starbuck2.html. (last visited Apr. 2, 2001) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
14. Id; see also Vela, supra note 2 (documenting the impact of the anthrax vaccine program
on Major Bates’s Air Force career).
15. Memorandum from Major Sonnie G. Bates to Brigadier General Starbuck, supra note
13; E-mail from Captain John Buck, U.S. Air Force, to Randall D. Katz (Feb. 21, 2001) (on file
with the Duke Law Journal). The government does not release figures showing the number of
soldiers who have refused the anthrax vaccine. Reports by the Associated Press estimate the
number to be between 300 and 500. Deborah Funk, Air Force Physician Refuses to Submit to
Anthrax Vaccine, AIR FORCE TIMES, Jan. 15, 2001, at 16.
16. However, through many public pronouncements and press conferences, the Depart-
ment of Defense has concluded the vaccine is safe and effective. See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Def.,
The Official DOD Website for the Anthrax Vaccine Immunization Program, at http://www.
anthrax.osd.mil (last visited Apr. 2, 2001) (clicking on the “Test” button causes a pop-up win-
dow to appear, saying “Anthrax Kills, Vaccination Protects”) (on file with the Duke Law Jour-
nal).
17. Vela, supra note 2.
18. Doctor Faces Court-Martial, AIR FORCE TIMES, Feb. 26, 2001, at 2; Funk, supra note
15; E-mail from Captain John Buck to Randall D. Katz, supra note 15.
19. Funk, supra note 15; E-mail from Captain John Buck to Randall D. Katz, supra note
15.
20. Memorandum from William S. Cohen, Secretary, U.S. Department of Defense, to the
Secretaries of the Military Departments et al., U.S. Armed Forces (May 18, 1998), available at
http://www.anthrax.osd.mil/Site_Files/policies/Policy_imp_files/POLICY_imp.htm (on file with
the Duke Law Journal). On December 15, 1997, Secretary Cohen approved the program after a
two-year review depending on four factors: (1) supplemental testing to assure sterility, safety,
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congressional hearings and disputes as to the legality of ordering sol-
diers to take the vaccine. These hearings, held by the Subcommittee
on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations of
the House Government Reform Committee, have been highly critical
of AVIP.21 The media report that a substantial number of military
personnel, especially reservists, are leaving the armed forces because
they do not want to be vaccinated.22
The refusal of Major Bates to be vaccinated and the national at-
tention his case garnered raise fundamental questions about the va-
lidity of military orders, informed consent for experimental vaccines,
and medical ethics. This Note explores these issues, particularly the
question whether a commander can require a service member to
submit to an anthrax vaccination. This analysis necessarily involves
legal, policy, and medical questions. Part I examines anthrax and the
threat it poses. Part II explores the medical controversy surrounding
the vaccine. Part III discusses the legal issues concerning orders to
take the vaccine and includes an examination of the cases addressing
the legality of disobeying an order. Finally, Part IV analyzes whether
an order to take the anthrax vaccine is legal and concludes that such a
direct order is illegal under federal law.
potency, and purity of the vaccine stockpile; (2) implementation of a system for fully tracking
anthrax immunizations; (3) approval of operational plans to administer the vaccine and com-
munications plans to inform military person; and (4) review of medical aspects of the program
by an independent expert. Id. In issuing the final May 18, 1998, order, Secretary Cohen stated
“all conditions for implementing the anthrax vaccination program for the total force have now
been met.” Id.
21. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 1-4.
22. Id. at 14 (reporting that “up to 30% of some units would resign or seek to transfer due
to the anthrax program”); Thomas E. Ricks, Anthrax Shots Cause Military Exodus; Many
Leaving Reserves, Guard Cite Pentagon Policy, GAO Says, WASH. POST, Oct. 11, 2000, at A29
(stating that the GAO Report deems “unhappiness with the mandatory anthrax program [as]
the top reason” pilots and other air crew members have left the Guard and Reserves over the
past two years); Jamie McIntyre, Congressional Report Says Anthrax Vaccine Large Part of Air
Force Exodus, CNN.com, Oct. 11, 2000, at http://www.cnn.com/2000/US/10/11/anthrax.military/
(citing GAO report claiming that twenty-five percent of pilots and air crew members in the
Guard and Reserve have changed their status or transferred since September 1998, with twenty-
five percent of those departing citing the anthrax vaccine as the major basis for their decision)
(on file with the Duke Law Journal).
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I.  THE ANTHRAX THREAT
A tiny amount can kill a lot of people, and quickly. One cubic cen-
timeter of anthrax bacteria—less than a thimbleful—dispersed into
the air could potentially kill hundreds of people.23
There is no question that anthrax is a deadly biological weapon
with the potential to cause significant destruction and loss of life.24 In-
halation of anthrax spores poses particularly great danger because the
spores can be stored for decades and spread over large areas.25 The
Department of Defense (DOD) believes that “anthrax can make an
excellent weapon of mass destruction. The spores may be used as a
weapon in a variety of delivery systems.”26 The Mayo Clinic, in a
study of anthrax’s potential use as a biological weapon, concluded
that “if billions of anthrax spores were in the air—as could be the case
if anthrax were disseminated by the explosion of a missile—you
would only have to take one or two deep breaths to inhale enough
organisms to cause serious infection.”27
Unclassified intelligence information reports that at least ten na-
tions are developing an offensive capacity to use anthrax in biological
warfare: China, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Libya, North Korea, South Korea,
Syria, Taiwan, and Russia.28 Egypt, Cuba, Japan, and the former So-
viet Republics also are on some unclassified lists.29 The DOD consid-
ers many areas where U.S. troops are stationed “high-threat” areas
for anthrax attacks, including Korea, Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman,
Saudi Arabia, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Yemen and Israel.30
The anthrax threat is compounded by the fact that there is no
immediate outward indication that an individual has been exposed to
anthrax—there is no cloud particle or distinct color, no smell, and no
23. Dr. Frank Cockerill, Anthrax—Ancient Disease Turned Biological Weapon, Mayo
Clinic, at http://www.mayohealth.org/mayo/9802/htm/anthrax.htm (last visited Oct. 9, 2000) (on
file with the Duke Law Journal).
24. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 19 (“Anthrax is the primary biological warfare threat
faced by U.S. forces.”); U.S. Dep’t of Def., Anthrax: Questions and Answers, supra note 10
(“[t]he Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff named anthrax as the #1 biological threat”).
25. U.S. Dep’t of Def., Anthrax: Questions and Answers, supra note 10.
26. U.S. Dep’t of Def., Anthrax: The Disease, at http://www.anthrax.osd.mil/Site_Files/qna/
DISEASE.htm (last visited Apr. 2, 2001) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
27. Cockerill, supra note 23.
28. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 18.
29. Id.
30. Id.
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taste.31 Nor is there an effective treatment for unvaccinated victims of
anthrax. However, if discovered early enough after infection (usually
within twenty-four to forty-eight hours), a high dose of antibiotics can
reduce the death rate of unvaccinated victims from 99% to 80%.32 To
vaccine proponents, this paltry success rate reinforces the need for
troops to be vaccinated against anthrax. The DOD believes the an-
thrax vaccination program is necessary because vaccination is the
most effective way to provide protection against anthrax.33
Opponents of mandatory vaccination argue that the DOD over-
states the anthrax threat and the department’s response is “well-
intentioned” but “over-broad.”34 The House Government Reform
Committee asserts that AVIP was “[b]orn of a post–Gulf War panic
over apparent weaknesses in chemical and biological warfare de-
fenses, [and] the AVIP is an unmanageably broad military undertak-
ing built on a dangerously narrow scientific and medical founda-
tion.”35 Over the past one hundred years, only one person has died in
a chemical or biological terrorist attack on United States soil.36 Dr.
Jonathan Tucker, a former United Nations weapons inspector in Iraq,
agrees that the threat is exaggerated:
U.S. policy-makers . . . have predicted catastrophic consequences if a
terrorist group . . . mounts a major chemical or biological attack. . . .
But these scenarios have not drawn on a careful assessment of ter-
rorist motivations and patterns of behavior . . . . [A]ctual attacks
were few in number, small in scale, and generally produced fewer
casualties than conventional bombs.37
Vaccination opponents assert that the only places where the exis-
tence of anthrax-spore stock has been confirmed are Southwest Asia,
31. U.S. Dep’t of Def., supra note 26.
32. Id.
33. Id.
 34. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 17.
35. Id. at 2.
36. CBS News, A Realistic View of Terrorism?, at http://cbsnews.com/now/story/
0,1597,158295-412,00.shtml (last visited Dec. 10, 2000) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). The
victim was Marcus Foster, a school superintendent. Id. He was shot by the Symbionese Libera-
tion Army in 1973, and “[h]is case counts only because the bullet was tipped with cyanide. The
fact of the matter is that making a weapon of mass destruction from scratch is extraordinarily
difficult.” Id.
37. Jonathan B. Tucker & Amy Sands, An Unlikely Threat, BULL. OF ATOMIC SCIENTISTS,
July/Aug. 1999, at 46, 46-47.
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Northwest Asia, and Iraq.38 Thus, the House Government Reform
Committee concluded that the anthrax threat was “tactically limited
and regional,” but the DOD’s solution was “universal.”39 In the final
analysis, it is difficult for civilians to assess the threat because most in-
formation involving biological warfare capabilities and intentions of
other countries is classified for national security purposes.40
II.  THE ANTHRAX VACCINE—THE MEDICAL CONTROVERSY
At best, the vaccine provides some measure of protection to most
who receive it. Just how much protection is acquired, by whom, for
how long, and against what level of challenge are questions DOD
answers with an excess of faith but a paucity of science.41
This part explores the concerns of medical and service personnel
about the health risks associated with anthrax vaccination, its long-
term effects, and its efficacy. Some service members have concluded
the vaccine is both unsafe and unnecessary.42 The medical controversy
over the vaccine has, in large part, engendered a political controversy.
The confusion regarding the vaccine has been exacerbated by House
Government Reform Committee hearings, which ultimately resulted
in a formal recommendation that the DOD halt the anthrax vaccina-
tion program.43
The vaccine originally was recognized by the U.S. Food & Drug
Administration (FDA) as “Anthrax Vaccine Absorbed” (AVA) and
was first developed for use in human beings in the 1950s.44 AVA in-
volves six shots over an eighteen-month immunization schedule.45 The
vaccine, according to the DOD, has been used in the past by profes-
sionals who are susceptible to contracting anthrax through the skin,
38. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 19-20.
39. Id. at 20. Iraq has admitted to loading anthrax spores into warheads during the Gulf
War. U.S. Dep’t of Def., Anthrax: Questions and Answers, supra note 10.
40. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 23.
41. Id. at 2.
42. See, e.g., Funk, supra note 15 (detailing the case of Dr. John Buck, an Air Force physi-
cian who refused the vaccine); Vela, supra note 2 (discussing Major Sonnie Bates’s refusal to
accept the vaccine).
43. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 4.
44. U.S. Dep’t of Def., Anthrax Vaccine—Overview, at http://www.anthrax.osd.mil/
Site_Files/qna/OVERVIEW.htm (last visited Oct. 9, 2000) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
45. Id. The schedule for anthrax vaccinations is day 1, 2 weeks, 4 weeks, 6 months, 12
months, and 18 months. Id.
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such as veterinarians, laboratory workers, and livestock handlers.46
The 1970 AVA vaccine is FDA-licensed and approved.47 Those who
argue that an order to take the vaccine is illegal contend that FDA
approval is illusory and that the vaccine should be considered an in-
vestigational new drug (IND) under FDA guidelines.48 Under federal
law, drugs classified as INDs cannot be administered without the in-
formed consent of the patient.49 If the use, dosage, or formula of a
previously approved vaccine is altered, under FDA guidelines, the
vaccine is considered an investigational new drug.50 These legal issues
are discussed in more detail in Part III.
Multiple studies have tested the effectiveness of the anthrax vac-
cine. However, these studies have been conducted only on animals,
and there have been no studies of the vaccine’s efficacy on humans
who are exposed to anthrax through inhalation.51 Various medical
46. U.S. Dep’t of Def., Anthrax Vaccine—The Vaccine, at http://www.anthrax.osd.
mil/Site_Files/vaccine/vaccine_info.htm (last visited Oct. 9, 2000) (on file with the Duke Law
Journal).
47. Id. There are four stages to the FDA vaccine approval process: a pre-clinical stage, an
investigational new drug stage, a product license application process, and last, a post-licensure
stage. Lt. Col. John J. Michels, Jr. & Major Bruce Smith, Legality of Orders to Submit to An-
thrax Vaccination pt. III.B.1., available at http://www.majorbates.com/law/thebrief_html.htm
(last visited Nov. 10, 2000) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). See generally Investigational
New Drug Application, 21 C.F.R. § 312 (2000) (describing the procedures and requirements
governing the use of investigational new drugs). A drug must complete all the stages to be
FDA-licensed and approved. Michels & Smith, supra, pt. III.B.1.
48. Michels & Smith, supra note 47, pt. III.B.
49. See 10 U.S.C. § 1107(a) (Supp. V 1999) (requiring informed consent when investiga-
tional new drugs are required for members of the armed forces); 21 U.S.C. § 355(i)(4) (Supp. V
1999) (mandating informed consent for human users of investigational new drugs used for re-
search by experts); Exec. Order No. 13,139, 3 C.F.R. § 221 (2000) (ordering that informed con-
sent be obtained from each individual in the armed forces using an investigational new drug
unless waiver can be justified to the President), reprinted in 10 U.S.C. § 1107 (Supp. V 1999).
Informed consent is defined as “[a] patient’s knowing choice about treatment or a procedure,
made after a physician or other healthcare provider discloses whatever information a reasonably
prudent provider in the medical community would provide to a patient regarding the risks in-
volved in the proposed treatment.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 300 (7th ed. 1999).
50. Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, What Is a “New Drug” Within Meaning of § 201(p) of the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 133 A.L.R. FED. 229, § 2[a] (1996); Michels & Smith,
supra note 47, pt. III.B.1; see also United States v. Articles of Drug Consisting of the Following:
5906 Boxes, 745 F.2d 105, 115-19 (1st Cir. 1984) (holding that drugs that are not adequately
tested are considered investigational regardless of usage); Hoffman v. Sterling Drug, 485 F.2d
132, 137-39 (3d Cir. 1973) (stating that a drug originally used to treat malaria is to be considered
a “new” IND drug for the purposes of treating lupus).
51. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 42 (describing a GAO Report finding that the
only studies conducted on humans were those performed by Brachman, which used the original
vaccine that was not meant to prevent inhalation anthrax).
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studies conducted on guinea pigs and nonhuman mammals concluded
that the vaccine protects animals exposed to anthrax through skin
contact.52 Dr. Meryl Nass, an anthrax vaccine expert, summarized
these studies when testifying before Congress: “One can see varying
survival rates from 0–100% depending upon the strain of anthrax
used and possibly other parameters of the experiments.”53 Dr. J. Jar-
rett Clinton, the former deputy assistant secretary of defense for
health operations policy, has disagreed with Dr. Nass and claimed
that studies show that the survival rate for vaccinated nonhuman
mammals is 95%.54
Another concern is that no animal–human correlation studies
prove that vaccinated human beings are protected from anthrax. The
U.S. Government Accounting Office (GAO) reports that “several
studies have shown no direct comparison of immunity in humans to
that in monkeys.”55 The producer of the anthrax vaccine also noted
that “to date, no animal or other potency test has been demonstrated
to be well correlated with protection of humans. The potency test re-
quired for the present vaccine has not been well correlated to efficacy
in humans and it is doubtful it can be.”56 Moreover, the current vac-
cine may not protect against genetically engineered and altered an-
thrax strains. This claim has been bolstered by recent, unconfirmed
52. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAL READINESS: DOD FACES CHALLENGES
IN IMPLEMENTING ITS ANTHRAX VACCINE IMMUNIZATION PROGRAM 56 (1999).
53. Prepared Statement of Dr. Meryl Nass, Comm. on Gov’t Reform, Subcomm. on Na-
tional Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations [NSVAIR] Anthrax Hearing (II)
108, quoted in HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 59. Dr. Nass also told the Committee that sur-
vival rates in guinea pigs varied from 23% to 71% when they were exposed to inhalation an-
thrax. Id.
54. Dr. J. Jarrett Clinton, Anthrax Vaccine Presentation (2000) (videotaped presentation on
file with the Duke Center on Law, Ethics and National Security). This presentation is based on
a study of rhesus monkeys that concluded that the monkeys had a 95% survival rate. Id. (citing
Prepared Statement of Dr. Sue Bailey, Asst. Secretary for Health Affairs, Dep’t of Def.,
NSVAIR Anthrax Hearing (I), at 11); see U.S. Dep’t of Def., Anthrax Vaccine: Effectiveness § 5,
at http://www.anthrax.osd.mil/Site_Files/qna/EFFECTIVENESS.htm (last visited Apr. 9, 2001)
(reporting an experiment in which forty-four of forty-five vaccinated monkeys exposed to in-
haled anthrax survived with full health) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
55. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 52, at 56.
56. Mich. Biologic Prods. Inst., Investigational New Drug Application for Anthrax Vaccine
Absorbed 28-29 (Sept. 20, 1996) (unpublished manuscript on file with the Duke Law Journal);
see also HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 60 (citing a study suggesting that the DOD is incapa-
ble of “performing accurate monitoring because of the DOD’s ‘institutionalized resistance to
associating health effects with the vaccine’”).
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reports that Russian government scientists have genetically altered
strains of anthrax to create a new biological weapon.57
Long-term studies of the vaccine’s effect on humans have not
been conducted.58 Studies of the vaccine’s effect on animal carcino-
genesis or the impairment of fertility have not been conducted.59 The
vaccine was approved in 1970 only for cutaneous (skin) exposure to
anthrax, not exposure through inhalation.60 It is unlikely, according to
Congress, that the vaccine would be approved under today’s regula-
tory scheme because of the increased scrutiny and scientific standards
the FDA employs.61 Both the GAO and Committee on Government
Reform have concluded the vaccine is not safe and effective: “con-
cerns about the efficacy, and by implication the necessity, of the vac-
cine are legitimate given the extent of unproven, unknown, and per-
haps unknowable, aspects of the protection afforded.”62
The DOD counters that the vaccine is safe and points to a pleth-
ora of published reports and studies to bolster its claim. The Centers
for Disease Control also have concluded the anthrax vaccine is safe.63
A study published in the Journal of the American Medical Association
determined that the potential benefits of the vaccine outweigh the
risks.64 The American Public Health Association concluded that “evi-
dence indicates that this vaccine is effective in preventing cutaneous
[skin] and inhalation anthrax . . . [and] it may . . . be used to protect
military personnel against potential exposure to anthrax used as a
biological warfare agent.”65
57. William J. Broad, Gene Engineered Anthrax: Is It a Weapon?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14,
1998, at A4; Former Soviet Biological Warfare Plants Still Pose Threat, Despite Transfer to
Peaceful Research, Cornell Researcher Says, SCIENCEDAILY MAG., Feb. 19, 2000, at http://www.
sciencedaily.com/releases/2001/02/010219081219.htm (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
58. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 57.
59. Id.
60. Anthrax Vaccine Adsorbed: Product Information Insert, at http://www.bioport.com/
PrincipleProducts/AVAInsert/AVA_Images/anthrax1.jpg (last modified Mar. 1999) (on file
with the Duke Law Journal).
61. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 64.
62. Id. at 61.
63. Food and Drug Admin., Biological products; Bacterial Vaccines and Toxoids; Imple-
mentation of Efficacy Review, 50 Fed. Reg. 51,002-117 (Dec. 13, 1985); see also U.S. Dep’t of
Def., supra note 44, § 10 (“Today, there is a broad consensus that the FDA-licensed anthrax
vaccine is safe and effective for people at high risk of exposure.”).
64. Arthur M. Friedlander et al., Anthrax Vaccine: Evidence for Safety and Efficacy Against
Inhalation Anthrax, 281 JAMA 2104, 2106 (1999).
65. See AM. PUB. HEALTH ASS’N, CONTROL OF COMMUNICABLE DISEASES MANUAL
(17th ed. 2000), quoted in U.S. Dep’t of Def., Anthrax Vaccine: Safety, at http://www.anthrax.
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FDA officials also have insisted the vaccine is safe. On Novem-
ber 3, 1999, four members of Congress asked the FDA to reclassify
the anthrax vaccine as an IND,66 thereby rendering it illegal for the
DOD to administer it to service members without their informed con-
sent.67 The FDA responded on November 26, 1999, that “there is
presently no basis for concluding that the anthrax vaccine, a licensed
product, when used in accordance with current labeling, should be
used pursuant to an IND application or, as requested in your letter,
that FDA ‘place the anthrax vaccine back under IND status.’”68 A
1997 letter from the FDA’s Dr. Michael Friedman to DOD officials
reached the same conclusion.69
To ensure the safety and effectiveness of the AVIP Program,
Secretary Cohen required that AVIP meet certain safety, operational,
tracking, and medical conditions before it was fully implemented.70
After a multiple-year review of the conditions, Secretary Cohen, in
1998, decided that these requirements were satisfied and stated that
“all conditions for implementing the anthrax vaccination program for
the total force have now been met.”71 One of the conditions included
a review of the entire program by an independent medical expert.
The former dean of the Yale Medical School, Dr. Gerald Burrow,
conducted the review and concluded that the entire anthrax vaccina-
tion program—including the health and medical aspects—was safe
and effective.72
osd.mil/Site_Files/safety/safety_info.htm (last visited Apr. 9, 2001) (on file with the Duke Law
Journal).
66. The specifics of IND status are examined thoroughly infra Part III.B.
67. See Letter from Dan Burton et al., Representatives, U.S. House of Representatives, to
Dr. Jane E. Henney, Commissioner, FDA (Nov. 3, 1999) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
68. Letter from Melinda K. Plaisier, Associate Commissioner for Legislation, FDA, to Dan
Burton et al., Representatives, U.S. House of Representatives (Nov. 26, 1999) (on file with the
Duke Law Journal).
69. See Letter from Dr. Michael Friedman, Lead Deputy Commissioner, FDA, to Dr. Ste-
phen C. Joseph, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs, Department of Defense
(Mar. 13, 1997) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
70. The four factors designated by Secretary Cohen were: (1) supplemental testing to as-
sure sterility, safety, potency, and purity of the vaccine stockpile; (2) implementation of a system
for fully tracking anthrax immunizations; (3) approval of operational plans to administer the
vaccine and communications plans to inform military personnel; and (4) review of medical as-
pects of the program by an independent expert. Memorandum from William S. Cohen to the
Secretaries of the Military Departments, supra note 20.
71. Id.
72. U.S. Dep’t of Def., supra note 65; see also Clinton, supra note 54 (discussing a study
finding that rhesus monkeys exposed to the anthrax vaccine had a 95% survival rate).
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The contentious medical controversy, in turn, stirs the legal con-
troversy and serves as a basis for the defendant who refuses the an-
thrax vaccine to claim that an order to take the vaccine from a supe-
rior officer is illegal.
III.  THE LEGAL CONTROVERSY
[The military judge] also ruled that the order of the commanding of-
ficer to the petitioner, to report to the medical building and receive
an anthrax vaccination, was a lawful order and that she would in-
form the members that the order was lawful.73
The legal controversy over AVIP involves military, political, and
medical issues. The basic legal issue centers on whether a service
member can be ordered to submit to anthrax vaccination. The DOD’s
legal approach is straightforward: the vaccine is safe, effective, and
FDA-approved, and under existing case law, the determination of the
order’s legality is a question of law for a judge to decide, rather than a
factual issue for determination by a jury.
The refusing service member’s argument is more complicated:
the order to take the anthrax vaccine is illegal because the vaccine is
an experimental drug, and under federal law, it is illegal to use an ex-
perimental drug on non-consenting subjects. Service members can re-
fuse to follow illegal orders.74 Thus, the argument concludes, the
service member’s decision not to follow the order was proper because
the order was illegal. The following subparts explore both of these ar-
guments in more detail.
73. Perry v. Wesely, No. NMCM 200001397, 2000 WL 1775249, at *1 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App.
Nov. 29, 2000).
74. See U.S. GOV’T, MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL pt. IV, ¶ 14c(2)(a)(i) (1998)
(“When an accused is charged with willful disobedience of a lawful order under Article 90,
UCMJ, the order is presumed to be lawful, unless it is patently illegal.”). Defenses for refusal to
follow a lawful command or order are varied. The defenses include justification, necessity, du-
ress, inability, ignorance, or mistake. Id., Rule 196, II—111-114 (2000); Statement of John J.
Michels, Jr., House Comm. on Gov’t Reform, at http://www.house.gov/reform/hearings/
healthcare/00.10.03/michels.htm (Oct. 3, 2000) [hereinafter Michels Statement] (on file with the
Duke Law Journal). However, in regards to orders to take anthrax inoculations, “the most
likely defense is that the order conflicts with a statutory right of the person receiving the order,
i.e., the right to provide informed consent to the vaccination under 10 U.S.C. § 1107 or Execu-
tive Order 13139.” Id.; see also U.S. GOV’T, supra, pt. IV, ¶ 14c(2)(a)(iv). Section 1107 and Ex-
ecutive Order 13,139 are discussed extensively infra at Part III.B.
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A. The Case for the Legality of the Order
The case for the legality of an order to take the anthrax vaccine
is relatively clear: disobedience of a direct, lawful order from a supe-
rior officer is punishable under Articles 90 or 92 of the Uniform Code
of Military Justice (UCMJ). Article 90 prohibits willfully disobeying a
superior commissioned officer;75 Article 92 prohibits failing to obey an
order or regulation. 76 If the subject who refuses the vaccine is court-
martialed, the government files multiple interlocutory motions: (1)
that the lawfulness of the order should be decided as a question of
law and (2) that all evidence regarding the safety, efficacy, and neces-
sity of the vaccine should be excluded.77
A military order may be presumed lawful when an accused is
charged with willful disobedience of a lawful order;78 however, this
presumption is rebuttable. Moreover, the lawfulness of the order is an
issue to be resolved as an interlocutory matter by a judge.79 If the mili-
tary judge determines the order is lawful because lawfulness has not
been rebutted, the issue is not put to the jury.80
Thus, if these dual motions are granted, the jurors do not con-
sider the safety, necessity, and efficacy of the vaccine.81 Since there
are no reported cases where the military judge has denied the gov-
ernment’s aforementioned motions regarding the anthrax vaccine, the
75. Article 90 provides that “[a]ny person subject to this chapter who . . . willfully disobeys
a lawful command of his superior commissioned officer; [sic] shall be punished . . . if the offense
is committed at any other time [than war], by such punishment, other than death, as a court-
martial may direct.” 10 U.S.C. § 890 (1994) (U.C.M.J. Art. 90).
76. 10 U.S.C. § 892 (1994) (U.C.M.J. Art. 92):
Any person subject to this chapter who—(1) violates or fails to obey any lawful gen-
eral order or regulation; (2) having knowledge of any other lawful order issued by any
member of the armed forces, which it is his duty to obey, fails to obey the order . . .
shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.
77. See, e.g., Ponder v. Stone, 54 M.J. 613, 614 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 2000) (holding that
the legal authority of an order is not based on the safety of the vaccine).
78. U.S. GOV’T, supra note 74, pt. IV-19, ¶ 14c(2)(a)(i).
79. Perry v. Wesely, No. NMCM 200001397, 2000 WL 1775249, at *3 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App.
Nov. 29, 2000); United States v. New, 50 M.J. 729, 739 (A. Ct. Crim. App. 1999).
80. U.C.M.J. § 851, art. 51(b), reprinted in MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL A2-14 (1998);
R.C.M. 801 (e)(1), (5), Discussion, reprinted in MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL II75-76
(1998). Unlike civilian jurors, military jurors, known as “members,” are not chosen at random.
U.C.M.J. § 825, art. 25(a), (d)(2). Members are selected by the court-martial Convening
Authority on the basis of their “age, education, training, experience, length of service, and judi-
cial temperament.” Id. art. 51(d)(2). The Uniform Code of Military Justice provides that, when-
ever possible, “no member of an armed force may be tried by a court-martial any member of
which is junior to him in rank or grade.” Id. art. 51(d)(1).
81. Perry, 2000 WL 1775249, at *3.
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defense essentially is left without a case. Once the motions are
granted, the defendant can appeal and seek a writ of mandamus or-
dering reversal of the twin interlocutory motions, but in the cases de-
cided to date, this request always has been denied.82
The prosecution has historical precedent as a basis on which to
argue that the order to take the vaccine is lawful. As commander of
the Continental Army during the Revolutionary War, General
George Washington mandated smallpox vaccinations for troops in
1777.83 On the legal front, United States v. Chadwell84 also provides
support for the legality of orders to take vaccines. In Chadwell, the
Navy Board of Review (now the Navy–Marine Corps Court of Crimi-
nal Appeals) upheld the convictions of two marines who refused to
submit to smallpox, typhoid, paratyphoid, and influenza vaccinations
because of religious beliefs, which the seamen argued were constitu-
tionally protected.85 The Chadwell court stated that religious beliefs
were not above military orders: “to permit this would be to make the
professed doctrines of religious belief superior to military orders, and
in effect to permit every soldier to become a law unto himself. The
military would be impotent under such circumstances.”86 Moreover,
the opinion emphasized that the service members volunteered for
service and “elected to become members of the military,” so they
easily could have followed their religious beliefs by not joining the
Marine Corps in the first place.87 Even if they had not volunteered,
the Supreme Court has held that compulsory vaccinations by local
health boards do not violate the Constitution.88 In the context of an-
thrax, court-martialed members generally refuse the vaccine because
of health and safety reasons, which arguably are entitled to less con-
82. See, e.g., Ponder, 54 M.J. at 617 (rejecting a petition a for writ of mandamus); Rose v.
Delzompo, No. NMCM 200001187 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. Nov. 29, 2000) (on file with the Duke
Law Journal).
83. U.S. Dep’t of Def., Desk Reference on Vaccines and Immunity, at http://www.anthrax.
osd.mil/Site_Files/articles/INDEXclinical/Desk_Ref_files/mvp-guide.htm (last visited Apr. 6,
2001) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
84. 36 C.M.R. 741 (1965).
85. Id. at 748.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 18-19 (1905) (holding that the Massachu-
setts smallpox compulsory vaccination program was not an unreasonable invasion of an individ-
ual’s liberty and had a real and substantial relation to the protection of the public health and
safety).
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stitutional protection than religious beliefs. No explicit constitutional
provision guarantees the protection of citizens’ health.89
A recent Army Court of Criminal Appeals decision that bolsters
the government’s case is United States v. New.90 Specialist Michael
New refused an order to wear United Nations (UN) accoutrements
on his Army battle dress uniform because he believed wearing the
UN insignia constituted an “involuntary change of allegiance from
the United States to the United Nations.”91 Specialist New was found
guilty of failure to obey a lawful order and sentenced to a bad con-
duct discharge.92 The Army Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the
sentence and made important findings regarding the legality of or-
ders: (1) “an order is presumed to be lawful” and a “soldier disobeys
an order on his own personal responsibility and at his own risk”93; (2)
the accused charged with disobeying lawful orders “bears the heavy
burden of showing that the orders were illegal”94; and (3) “unless the
order requires an obviously illegal act, or is obviously beyond the is-
suer’s authority, the service member will obey the order.”95
Prosecutors use this case in courts-martial to stand for the propo-
sition that as a matter of law an order to submit to anthrax vaccina-
tion is legal, just as the order to wear the UN patch was legal.96 In-
structors at the Naval Justice School instruct attorneys to use New
when arguing anthrax legality issues. The instructors believe New es-
tablishes the legality of the order as a matter of law. The only issues
left under Article 90 are whether the military member knew of the
order and whether or not he followed the order.97 The jury does not
get to decide the lawfulness issue.98 The use of New in the future is
uncertain, however, because the case is under review by the U.S.
89. In fact, about the time Chadwell was decided, Justice Stewart referred to freedom of
religion as the most important freedom guaranteed by our Constitution: “I am convinced that no
liberty is more essential to the continued vitality of the free society which our Constitution
guarantees than is the religious liberty protected by the Free Exercise Clause.” Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 413 (1963) (Stewart, J., concurring).
90. 50 M.J. 729 (A. Ct. Crim. App. 1999).
91. Id. at 734.
92. Id. at 733. Specialist New was found guilty of violating Article 92 of the U.C.M.J. Id.
93. Id. at 739 (citation omitted).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. E-mail from Captain John Deaton, U.S. Navy, to Randall D. Katz (Dec. 5, 2000) (on
file with the Duke Law Journal).
97. Id.
98. Id.
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Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces.99 Another advantage for the
prosecution is that at least one court has commented that the ques-
tion of the anthrax program’s legality was a political decision made by
Secretary Cohen and is therefore a nonjusticiable political question.100
Litigated cases use the aforementioned government arguments.
The recent case of Marine Corps Lance Corporal Ocean Rose is typi-
cal.101 Rose was charged with willfully disobeying his superior officer’s
order to take his third anthrax shot, in violation of Articles 90 and 92,
UCMJ.102 The military judge heard dual government motions to ex-
clude evidence pertaining to the licensing, safety, and efficacy of the
vaccine and to rule that the order was legal as a matter of law.103 The
judge granted both of the government’s motions.104 Lance Corporal
Rose appealed to the Navy–Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals
and requested extraordinary relief in the form of a writ of manda-
mus.105 The request was denied, and Lance Corporal Rose was pre-
cluded from presenting any factual evidence.106 Most, if not all, of the
cases denying the mandamus petition read like Rose’s case; in fact,
99. United States v. New, 52 M.J. 465, 465 (C.A.A.F. 1999) (granting review). As of the
date of publication (April 2001), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces has yet to de-
cide New.
100. See Perry v. Wesely, No. NMCM 200001397, 2000 WL 1775249, at *3 n.2 (N-M. Ct.
Crim. App. Nov. 29, 2000) (“Complicating the inquiry in the petitioner’s case is his effort to con-
test the lawfulness of the commanding officer’s order by litigating the legality of the DoD an-
thrax vaccination program itself, a nonjustiticable political decision.”). For a discussion involv-
ing whether an issue constitutes a political question, see Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 208-237
(1962).
101. See generally Rose v. Delzompo, No. NMCM 200001187 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. Nov. 29,
2000) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (detailing the case against Lance Corporal Rose for
refusing to follow an order to be vaccinated).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
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there seems to be a “cutting-and-pasting” of the same language from
one anthrax appeal case to another.107
107. Compare Ponder v. Stone, 54 M.J. 613 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 2000), with Perry v. We-
sely, No. NMCM 200001397, 2000 WL 1775249 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. Nov. 29, 2000).
In Ponder, Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals Senior Judge Leo, joined by
Judges Anderson and Naugle wrote:
After receiving evidence and hearing argument from counsel, the military judge in
this case ruled that the petitioner’s order was lawful as a matter of law and stated that
he would so instruct the court-martial members, thereby precluding the petitioner
from putting the matter before the members as an issue of fact.
The petitioner had argued that, by statute, informed consent must be obtained by
the Secretary of Defense from members of the Armed Forces before an IND or a
drug unapproved for its applied use may be administered, unless the President waives
this requirement. 10 U.S.C. § 1107(f)(1). Similarly, he argued that informed consent
must be obtained by the Secretary of Defense from any human subject of an experi-
ment or a test directly related to protection against toxic chemicals or biological
weapons and agents. 50 U.S.C. § 1520a(c). Therefore, he wanted to introduce evi-
dence showing that the anthrax vaccine was the type of drug requiring informed con-
sent under both statutes.
Executive Order 13139, which implements 10 U.S.C. § 1107, clearly states that the
requirements it incorporated from the statute are for internal management only and
confer no right enforceable by any party against the United States. E.O. 13139, § 6(b).
Additionally, Secretary of the Navy Instruction 6230.4 of 29 April 1998, which im-
plements the Department’s anthrax vaccination implementation program [DON
AVIP], states that the anthrax vaccine is a FDA-licensed product and not an IND re-
quiring informed consent for its administration. . . . This would imply that the vaccine
is also not an experimental or test drug that would require informed consent under 50
U.S.C. § 1520a(c). According to the DON AVIP instruction, anthrax immunization is
mandatory and those refusing the vaccine are subject to disciplinary action.
SECNAVINST 6230.4, Annex E to Enclosure (1) at E-11. Under these circum-
stances, the petitioner has not shown that the military judge’s ruling is so contrary to
statute, settled case law, or valid military regulation as to deny him relief that is
clearly and indisputably due him as a matter of right. [McKinney v. Jarvis, 46 M.J.
870, 874 (A. Ct. Crim. App. 1997)]. Accordingly, we find that the issuance of an ex-
traordinary writ at this time is neither necessary nor appropriate.
Ponder, 54 M.J. at 616-17.
In Perry, Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals Judges Dorman, Ozmun, and
Naugle, in a per curium opinion, wrote:
After receiving evidence and hearing argument from counsel, the military judge in
this case ruled that the petitioner’s order was lawful as a matter of law and stated that
she would so instruct the court-martial members, thereby precluding the petitioner
from putting the matter before the members as an issue of fact. The petitioner argued
on the motion that, by statute, informed consent must be obtained by the Secretary of
Defense from members of the Armed Forces before an IND or a drug unapproved
for its applied use may be administered, unless the President waives this requirement.
10 U.S.C. § 1107(f)(1). Similarly, Executive Order 13139 also requires informed con-
sent. Therefore, the petitioner sought to introduce evidence showing that the anthrax
vaccine was the type of drug requiring informed consent under both the statute and
the Executive Order. Executive Order 13139, which implements 10 U.S.C. § 1107,
however, clearly states that the requirements that it incorporated from that statute
are for internal management only and confer no right enforceable by any party
against the United States. E.O. 13139, § 6(b). Additionally, Secretary of the Navy In-
struction 6230.4 of 29 April 1998, which implements the Department’s anthrax vacci-
nation implementation program [DON AVIP], states that the anthrax vaccine is an
FDA-licensed product and not an IND requiring informed consent for its administra-
tion. . . . That would imply that the vaccine is also not an experimental or test drug
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The case of Builder Third Class David Ponder reads similarly.108
The military judge granted the dual government motions109 and this
determination was upheld on appeal.110 In fact, the government’s posi-
tion always has been upheld on appeal. No defendant, in any branch
of the Armed Forces, has been able to argue successfully the merits
(including the safety, efficacy, and necessity) of the anthrax vaccine.
The government’s strategy, which has been wholly successful, is to
foreclose the case procedurally before the merits can be substantively
evaluated. The defense is left defenseless.
B. The Case Against the Legality of the Order
A soldier prosecuted for refusing to submit to anthrax vaccina-
tion would make a complex argument, if permitted to defend himself
on the substantive merits. The defense would involve a three-step ar-
gument. First, the anthrax vaccine is not FDA-approved because of
alterations in its chemical formula and a change in its intended use
from the original vaccine. As such, the FDA must consider it an IND.
Second, since the vaccine is an IND, it requires informed consent of
the service member under federal law and a Presidential Executive
Order. Third, since the current vaccine is illegal to administer and was
administered without consent, the order directing the service member
to become vaccinated was illegal.
The defense would argue that the anthrax vaccine should be
characterized as an IND under FDA regulations because the vaccine
is improperly used and because the purpose for which it is now used
that would require informed consent. According to this instruction, anthrax immuni-
zation is mandatory and those refusing the vaccine are subject to disciplinary action. .
. .
Under these circumstances, the petitioner has not shown that the military judge’s
rulings are so contrary to statute, settled case law, or valid regulation as to deny him
relief that is clearly and indisputably due him as a matter of right. [McKinney v. Jar-
vis, 46 M.J. 870, 874 (A. Ct. Crim. App. 1997)]. Accordingly, we find that the issuance
of an extraordinary writ at this time is neither necessary nor appropriate.
Perry, 2000 WL 1775249, at *3-4. Perry appealed his case to the U.S. Supreme Court, but his
petition for writ of mandamus was denied. In re Perry, 121 S. Ct. 1396 (2001). His claim that the
military judge violated his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights was turned down without com-
ment. Marine Loses Appeal over Anthrax Vaccine, WASH. POST, Mar. 20, 2001, at A17; Marine
Loses Challenge to Vaccine Prosecution, CNN.com (Mar. 19, 2001), at http://www.cnn.com/2001/
LAW/03/19/scotus.anthraxvaccine.ap/index.html (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
108. Ponder, 54 M.J. at 614-15.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 617.
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differs from the purpose for which it was approved originally.111 The
FDA considers a drug on IND status, even if it has been used for
years, if there has been a change in the product’s end use, formula,
dilution, product repackaging, or route of administration.112
The 1970 anthrax vaccine (AVA)113 was approved originally for
anthrax exposure through the skin, not for exposure by inhalation.
The 1970 AVA was licensed for animal handlers who might come
into contact with cutaneous anthrax by working with animals.114 By
contrast, the main goal of the DOD’s vaccination program is to pre-
vent inhalation anthrax. If able to surmount the government’s pre-
liminary objections,115 the defense would contend that this constitutes
a change in the target use of the product. The DOD and the sole
AVA producer have recognized that AVA was not approved for in-
halation anthrax, and they took steps in 1995 to file a new IND appli-
cation to approve the vaccine for inhalation anthrax and to change
the inoculation schedule from six to three doses.116 Due to production
problems with the vaccine’s manufacturer that have led to a shortage
of the vaccine,117 the DOD recently announced that soldiers who re-
ceived only two shots of the six-shot sequence, but did not finish the
sequence, will not have to repeat the initial sequence of shots and will
be able to receive additional shots to complete the sequence for up to
two years.118 Both the IND application and the DOD’s differing in-
111. FDA approval is not a prerequisite for use by the DOD. The FDA only regulates the
manufacturer in the vaccines’ making, not use. The FDA does not have jurisdiction to regulate
the administration of the AVA. See Michels & Smith, supra note 47, pt. III.B.2.
112. See Zitter, supra note 50, at 286-91 (providing an annotation of cases illustrating a large
variety of products considered “new drugs” by the FDA); Michels & Smith, supra note 47, pt.
III.B.1 (discussing IND status); see also U.S. v. Articles of Drug Consisting of the Following:
5906 Boxes, 745 F.2d 105, 113-17 (1st Cir. 1984) (holding that drugs that are not adequately
tested are considered investigational regardless of usage); Hoffman v. Sterling Drug, 485 F.2d
132, 137-38 (3d Cir. 1973) (stating that drug originally used to treat malaria is to be considered a
“new” IND drug for the purposes of treating lupus).
113. See supra Part II (discussing the medical aspects of the anthrax vaccine).
114. U.S. Dep’t of Def., supra note 46.
115. See supra notes 78-82 and accompanying text (describing preliminary issues).
116. Michels & Smith, supra note 47, pt. III.B.2; Sci. Applied Info. Corp., Anthrax Vaccine
License Amendment Project Plan’ Information Briefing for Joint Program Managers at Dep’t of
Def., Bio. Def. Div. (Oct. 20, 1995).
117. Infra notes 171, 182.
118. See James G. Bishop, DoD Slows down Anthrax Effort, AIR RESERVE PERSONNEL
UPDATE, Sept./Oct. 2000, at 1 (interviewing Dr. Sue Bailey, Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Health Affairs); Michels Statement, supra note 74; Col. Randy Randolph, Slowdown Notice,
Department of Defense Anthrax Vaccine Immunization Program, at http://www.anthrax.osd.
mil/HTML_interface/map/slowdownnotice.htm (last visited Apr. 26, 2001) (on file with the
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oculation schedule constitute a change in the dosage of the vaccine.
Moreover, the GAO discovered that the vaccine given to service
members does not have the same chemical formula as that approved
by the FDA in 1970.119 This is an alteration in the drug’s formula. This
surprising conclusion was released in a 1999 GAO report that stated
the current anthrax vaccine is not the same vaccine that was tested
originally and approved prior to 1970.120 These material changes con-
stitute changes in the target use of the product, dosage, and formula.
In essence, the DOD recognized that the vaccine “as labeled, was not
legally viable and undertook the appropriate steps to change product
use labeling, method of administration, and vaccination schedule.
These substantial changes in how this drug was to be used rendered it
an IND.”121 The IND application, filed in 1996, is still current and
pending.122 The House Government Reform Committee agrees that
AVA is an IND and contends that AVA used for inhalation anthrax
is “an off-label use of the product to treat an indication for which it is
not explicitly licensed. . . . Both the new indication and the new
schedule should be undertaken only pursuant to FDA regulations
governing clinical trials on investigational new drugs.”123
Furthermore, soldiers prosecuted for disobeying an order to
submit to vaccination would argue that there have been no credible
studies to demonstrate that AVA, or the current vaccine chemical
mix, is effective against inhalation anthrax in humans.124 According to
the First Circuit Court of Appeals, a drug must be considered an IND
if there is no general evidence that a vaccine is considered effective
and safe.125
Duke Law Journal). The dosage schedule for the anthrax vaccine is day 1, 2 weeks, 4 weeks, 6
months, 12 months, and 18 months. Supra note 45.
119. Medical Readiness: Safety and Efficacy of the Anthrax Vaccine: Hearing Before the
House Subcomm. on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations of the
House Comm. on Governmental Reform, 106th Cong. 14 (1999) (statement of Kwai-Cheung
Chan) [hereinafter Chan]; see also Michels & Smith, supra note 47, pt. III.B.2 (discussing
changes in labeling, method of administration, and the vaccination schedule).
120. Chan, supra note 119.
121. Michels & Smith, supra note 47, pt. III.B.2.
122. Id.
123. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 3; Michels & Smith, supra note 47, pt. III.B.2.
124. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 58 (describing a GAO Report that the only stud-
ies conducted on humans were those performed by Brachman and used the original vaccine
which was not meant to prevent inhalation anthrax).
125. See United States v. Articles of Drug Consisting of the Following: 5906 Boxes, 745 F.2d
105, 117 (1st Cir. 1984) (requiring general recognition of a drug’s safety and effectiveness for it
to be exempt from FDA approval).
KATZ 06/03/01 11:44 AM
2001] FRIENDLY FIRE 1855
By establishing that the vaccine is an IND, the defendant would
trigger the informed consent requirement under the Notice of Use of
an Investigational New Drug statute126 and Executive Order 13,139.127
The Notice of Use of an Investigational New Drug statute, 10 U.S.C.
§ 1107, requires the Secretary of Defense to provide notice when a
member of the armed forces receives “an investigational new drug or
a drug unapproved for its applied use.”128 Under § 1107(f), only the
President of the United States has the authority and power to waive
the consent requirement.129
Former President Clinton issued Executive Order 13,139, which
provides in § 3(a) that the DOD must obtain “informed consent from
each individual” to whom an IND is administered.130 Moreover, the
order sharply limits presidential waivers and states that “waivers of
informed consent will be granted only when absolutely necessary.”131
The order also mandates that an IND must be grounded in scientific
study: “[the IND] shall be studied through scientifically based re-
search and development protocols to determine whether it is safe and
effective for its intended use.”132 The defense would argue that § 1107
and Executive Order 13,139 clearly establish that the DOD must ob-
tain informed consent unless it is waived by the President. President
Clinton did not waive consent during his term of office, and President
George W. Bush has yet to waive the consent requirement.133
Thus, the defense would argue that federal law requires informed
consent procedures to be followed when administering an IND. Since
126. 10 U.S.C. § 1107 (Supp. V 1999).
127. Exec. Order No. 13,139, 3 C.F.R. § 221 (2000), reprinted in 10 U.S.C. § 1107 (Supp. V
1999).
128. 10 U.S.C. § 1107(a) (Supp. V 1999).
129. Id. § 1107(f).
130. Exec. Order No. 13,139, 3 C.F.R. § 221 (2000), reprinted in 10 U.S.C. § 1107 (Supp. V
1999).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. In fact, President George W. Bush expressed concern about AVIP while running for
the presidency: 
The Defense Department’s Anthrax Immunization Program has raised numerous
health concerns and caused fear among the individuals whose lives it touches. I don’t
feel the current administration’s anthrax immunization program has taken into ac-
count the effect of this program on the soldiers in our military and their families. Un-
der my administration, soldiers and their families will be taken into consideration.
The Presidential Candidates Weigh in on Federal Medicine: George W. Bush, U.S. Medicine,
(Sept. 2000), at http://www.usmedicine.com/article.cfm?articleID=65&issueID=16 (on file with
the Duke Law Journal).
KATZ 06/03/01 11:44 AM
1856 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 50:1835
the current vaccine is an IND and is illegal to administer absent in-
formed consent or waiver, an order requiring service members to ob-
tain the anthrax vaccination is illegal because mandatory procedures
were not followed. In a recent opinion, the Navy–Marine Corps Court
of Criminal Appeals, while upholding the military judge’s decision to
declare the order legal as a matter of law and to exclude evidence
pertaining to the safety and efficacy of the vaccine, dismissed in three
sentences the defense arguments based on the Notice of Use of an In-
vestigational New Drug Statute, § 1107, and Executive Order
13,139.134 The judges stated that the Executive Order implements 10
U.S.C. § 1107, and they determined that § 6(b) of the Order limits the
Order’s scope to “internal management only and confers no rights en-
forceable by any party against the United States.”135 Thus, the Execu-
tive Order does not confer standing on any private party.
Other than the aforementioned three-sentence determination,
there is no case law evaluating the defense’s possible arguments, be-
cause the defense is not allowed to make an argument on the merits.
IV.  ANALYSIS
The AVIP raises an ominous question: who protects the force from
ill-conceived force protection?136
The crux of the debate concerns procedural rules (government
case) versus evaluation of substantive merits (defense case). The de-
fendant’s case should be heard on the merits, and military judges
should rule that the presumed lawfulness of an order to take the vac-
cine is rebutted by the substantial evidence regarding the IND status
of the vaccine. The court should examine the evidence and then rule
on the merits. However, the analysis is not that simple: as emphasized
throughout this Note, the anthrax inoculation issue is an interdiscipli-
nary one, and any analysis needs to take into account not only legal
issues, but also political, medical, and human rights concerns.
There are many reasons why military courts do not fully explore
the merits of anthrax vaccination refusal cases. Part IV.A. argues that
military judges may be reluctant to overturn a decision made by the
Secretary of Defense or high-ranking officials. This subpart also dis-
134. Perry v. Wesely, No. NMCM 200001397, 2000 WL 1775249, at *3 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App.
Nov. 29, 2000).
135. Id.
136. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 3.
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cusses problems the Pentagon may face if a court does indeed de-
cide—or the Pentagon concedes—the vaccine is an IND. The argu-
ment then shifts, in Part IV.B., to the contention that the Pentagon
has admitted tacitly that the current anthrax vaccine is an IND. Part
IV.C then critiques judicial arguments against hearing anthrax vac-
cine refusal cases. Finally, the Conclusion argues that the Pentagon
must regain the trust of its service members by halting the AVIP, as
recommended by a subcommittee of the House of Representatives.
A. Pandora’s Box and Military Judges: Caught Between the Checks
and Balances
Military judges may be reluctant to decide that an order to sub-
mit to vaccination is unlawful. Military judges are appointed to their
positions by their respective Judge Advocates General and do not
have Article III lifetime appointments.137 They are not as independent
as Article III judges138 and may fear reprisals. Allowing the presump-
tion of lawfulness to be rebutted would surely open a Pandora’s box
of sorts. One decision by one military judge in one branch of the
service could be the beginning of the end for AVIP; a promising ca-
reer could come to a screeching halt for the military judge who inter-
feres with a decision made by the Secretary of Defense and high-
ranking Pentagon Officials.
The Supreme Court recognized potential problems with the in-
dependence of military judges in Weiss v. United States.139 The Court
noted that military judges may be reassigned at any time because they
have no fixed term of office. “Commissioned Officers are assigned or
detailed to the position of military judge by a Judge Advocate Gen-
eral for a period of time he deems necessary or appropriate, and then
they may be reassigned to perform other duties.”140 Military judges
also are accountable to their respective Judge Advocates General for
their decisions. “By placing judges under the control of Judge Advo-
cates General, who have no interest in the outcome of a particular
137. Military judges are appointed under the Appointments Clause of Article II. See U.S.
CONST. art. II, § 2; Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 176 (1994) (upholding the current sys-
tem of appointing military judges as a constitutional application of the Appointments Clause).
138. Weiss, 510 U.S. at 175-76.
139. 510 U.S. 163 (1994). Note that the Court ruled against the petitioner’s argument. The
petitioner argued that military judges are not independent, neutral decisionmakers because they
are not appointed to a life tenure, as are Article III judges, and that due process was denied as a
result. Id. at 181.
140. Id. at 176.
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court-martial, we believe Congress has achieved an acceptable bal-
ance between independence and accountability.”141 What the Su-
preme Court failed to recognize is that Judge Advocates General may
indeed have a significant interest in the outcome of cases when a large
issue or principle is at stake. This is exactly the case with anthrax vac-
cinations; a ruling by a solitary military judge could halt AVIP. Judge
Advocates General, who oversee military judges, would likely have
an interest in that.
If AVIP were cancelled, the DOD also would face a significant
problem with service members who already received the vaccination:
how would the DOD defend its decision to vaccinate them? Would
deciding the order was “illegal” mean the DOD treated its soldiers
like guinea pigs? Such a decision could bring about an administrative
nightmare of allegations, claims, and distrust. In essence, a decision to
examine the merits of the case could cause a public relations mael-
strom and have serious implications. However, if the vaccine is truly
harmful, unsafe, and ineffective, the implications could be far more
sweeping.
The Pandora’s box, however, may be open already. The House
Government Reform Committee held public hearings and concluded
that AVIP should be suspended.142 Documents widely available on the
Committee’s website conflict sharply with the Pentagon’s conclu-
sions.143 This makes the decision for service members incredibly diffi-
cult; one branch of government is assuring them the vaccine is safe
and effective, while a subcommittee of another branch of government
is expressing grave concern about the vaccine—enough concern, in
fact, to recommend the program be stopped altogether. The legality
141. Id. at 180 (emphasis added).
142. The Department of Defense Anthrax Vaccine Immunization Program: Unproven Force
Protection, U.S. House of Representatives Comm. on Government Reform, Subcomm. on Na-
tional Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations, at http://www.house.gov/reform/
ns/reports/anthrax1.pdf (Feb. 17, 2000) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). The conclusions
were:
(1) force-wide, mandatory AVIP should be suspended until DOD obtains approval
for an improved vaccine. To accomplish this: (2) DOD should accelerate research and
testing on a second-generation, recombinant anthrax vaccine; and, (3) DOD should
pursue testing of the safety and efficacy of a shorter inoculation regimen; and, (4)
DOD should enroll all anthrax vaccine recipients in a comprehensive clinical evalua-
tion and treatment program for long term study; (5) While an improved vaccine is
being developed, use of the current anthrax vaccine for force protection against bio-
logical warfare should be considered experimental and undertaken only pursuant to
FDA regulations governing investigational testing for a new indication.
Id.
143. Id.
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of the order is thus caught between the checks and balances of the
executive and legislative branches.144
B. Department of Defense Recognition of AVA As an IND
With these concerns in mind, the DOD has recognized—and
tacitly admitted—that the current anthrax vaccine is an IND. The
Army discussed a plan in 1995 to file an IND application to change
the license of AVA to include effectiveness against inhalation anthrax
and the dosage schedule.145 In fact, the Army had Science Applied In-
formation Corporation (SAIC), a defense contractor, prepare an
“Anthrax Vaccine License Amendment Project Plan” that was pre-
sented to the Joint Program Manager for DOD Biological Defense on
October 19, 1995.146 According to the briefing materials, an amend-
ment would be sought to use the vaccine for inhalation anthrax and to
reduce the number of inoculations required.147 The DOD’s request
that SAIC prepare a briefing in order to amend the AVA license
strongly suggests that the DOD recognizes that the vaccine is an
IND.148 Moreover, in 1996, Bioport, the sole producer of AVA, filed
an investigational drug application with the FDA to modify the cur-
rent license. Filing an IND application to change the AVA’s licensing
requirements demonstrates an acknowledgment that the vaccine pos-
sesses IND status.149
Additionally, the DOD has made a policy of changing the dosage
schedule to remedy shortages of AVA.150 DOD policy now allows any
soldier who began the initial shot sequence, but failed to complete the
sequence approved by the FDA, to finish the inoculations where the
144. Indeed, a statement on the House Reform Committee website encourages vaccinated
members to write to the committee if they were vaccinated against anthrax: “If you are a
member of the Armed Services and you’ve had an experience with the Anthrax vaccine, either
good or bad, we want to hear from you. Please send your confidential email to
anthrax@mail.house.gov. Your identity will not be revealed.” United States House of
Representatives Committee on Government Reform, at http://www.house.gov/reform (last
visited Apr. 15, 2001) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
145. Michels & Smith, supra note 47, pt. III.B.2.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. This is so because IND status occurs when a manufacturer seeks to conduct clinical
tests of a medicine or biological agent. The IND status allows the manufacturer to conduct lim-
ited use of the product without FDA approval, as well as to transport the material across state
lines without violating FDA regulations. 21 C.F.R. § 312 (2000) (“An investigational new drug .
. . may be shipped lawfully for the purpose of conducting clinical investigation.”).
150. Supra notes 117-18 and accompanying text.
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soldier left off, up to two years since the last shot.151 This is a clear off-
label, IND use of the vaccine, which normally requires an eighteen-
month inoculation schedule.152 Even the FDA approval letters, fre-
quently used by the DOD to validate the legality of AVIP, state that
the vaccine must be used in a manner consistent with its label-
ing.153
The FDA approval letters for the anthrax vaccine are illusory.
Although the 1997 and 1999 letters written by FDA officials state that
the vaccine is not an IND, FDA regulations provide that statements
made in the letters have no legal effect on the IND status of the vac-
cine:
A statement made or advice provided by an FDA employee consti-
tutes an advisory opinion only if it is issued in writing under this sec-
tion. A statement or advice given by an FDA employee orally, or
given in writing but not under this Section of § 10.90 is an informal
communication that represents the best judgment of that employee at
the time but does not constitute an advisory opinion, does not neces-
sarily represent the formal position of the FDA, and does not bind or
otherwise obligate or commit the agency to the views expressed.154
The 1997 and 1999 letters were not issued pursuant to this section
and, as such, the letters do not commit the agency to the views ex-
pressed in the letters.155 In fact, the letters do not even constitute advi-
sory opinions. The Supreme Court recently held that agency opinion
letters are not entitled to deference by the Court.156 Rather, these
types of letters are entitled to “respect” only to the extent that the let-
ters’ interpretations are persuasive.157 The DOD argues that the FDA
letters validate its position that the AVA is not on IND status; how-
ever, since the letters are not agency-approved, do not constitute offi-
cial agency opinions, and fail to take into account that the DOD is
using AVA off-label, the letters are not persuasive.158 Thus, these let-
ters have no legal bearing on the IND status of the anthrax vaccine.
151. Supra note 118 and accompanying text.
152. Id.
153. Supra note 68 and accompanying text.
154. 21 C.F.R. § 10.85(k) (2000) (emphasis added) (quoted in Michels & Smith, supra note
47, at n.4).
155. Michels & Smith, supra note 47, at n.4.
156. Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 586-88 (2000).
157. Id.
158. See Michels Statement, supra note 74 (arguing for IND status).
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The DOD also has referred consistently to AVA as an IND in
AVIP’s files. The aforementioned 1995 examples of the Army’s be-
ginning the process of filing an IND application and requesting the
license amendment briefing are two such incidents.159 Since the DOD
has acknowledged tacitly that the vaccine is an IND, the presumption
that an order to submit to vaccination is lawful should be rebutted,
and military courts should analyze the lawfulness of the order and the
safety and efficacy of the current anthrax vaccine.
C. Critiquing Perry and Chadwell
The three-sentence judicial determination in Perry v. Wesely
stating that § 1107 and Executive Order 13,139 are not applicable to a
service member’s refusal to take the anthrax vaccine does not with-
stand close scrutiny.160 First, even if Executive Order 13,139 is an “in-
ternal management” policy, the DOD is violating that policy, because
the current vaccine is an IND. This logic leads to the conclusion that
if something is an internal policy, it does not have to be followed and
there is no accountability for refusing to follow it. Why have an inter-
nal management policy if it is ignored when convenient?
Second, and most importantly, the DOD expressly adopted the
requirements of Executive Order 13,139 and 10 U.S.C. § 1107 in a re-
cently published DOD Directive.161 The directive explicitly states,
“When using INDs for force health protection, DoD Components
shall comply with 10 U.S.C 1107, E.O. 13139, and applicable FDA
regulations.”162 DOD Directive 6200.2 goes on to lay out a compre-
hensive scheme to effectuate the requirements of Executive Order
13,139 and 10 U.S.C. § 1107 and specifically references both as
authority.163 Thus, the Navy Court not only was engaging in a sloppy
legal analysis by failing to analyze the directive, but its position is viti-
ated by the fact that the DOD expressly acknowledged that the law
applies and has published a directive to enforce the statute and execu-
tive order for service members.164
159. Supra notes 145-49 and accompanying text.
160. Perry v. Wesely, No. NMCM 200001397, 2000 WL 1775249, at *3 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App.
Nov. 29, 2000).
161. Department of Defense Directive 6200.2, § 4.14 (Aug. 1, 2000).
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. John J. Michels, counsel for Major Sonnie Bates, commented:
When you see obviously smart people such as the Navy Court making foolish deci-
sions that ignore DoD’s own directives, then you look for another reason for the deci-
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The Chadwell decision can be distinguished because it involved
entirely different circumstances than the anthrax vaccine refusal
cases. In Chadwell, the issue was not the safety and efficacy of the
vaccine; rather, it was about religious convictions against vaccines.165
The arguments are entirely different: one is based on a claim of free-
dom of religion and the other is based on federal statutes and execu-
tive orders requiring informed consent of subjects given an IND. The
Chadwell court stated “on its face the order was legal and this fact is
not contested by the appellant. It is only in the application of the or-
der of the two accused that it is contended that constitutional rights
are violated.”166 Unlike in Chadwell, the issue here is whether the or-
der was legal on its face, not in its application. If the vaccine is an
IND, it is illegal to administer it without informed consent. If it is not
an IND, the order is legal. Thus, the anthrax-refusal cases rest on an
entirely different rationale than Chadwell.
CONCLUSION
The issue—after all the legal, medical, and political analysis—ul-
timately is one of trust.167 In its report on the anthrax vaccine, Con-
gress noted that AVIP “lacks an essential element in a medical pro-
gram: trust. However well-intentioned, the anthrax vaccine effort is
viewed by many with suspicion. It is seen as another chapter in a long,
unhappy history of military medical malfeasance in which the healing
arts are corrupted to serve a lethal purpose.”168 The consequences are
severe if a service member who is ordered to take the vaccine loses
trust in medicine, the vaccine, or government decisions. A breakdown
in military order can, and perhaps will, occur.169
sion other than logic or jurisprudence. The decision reeks of pre-ordained outcome,
and I think that it is impossible for a military court at any level to properly review this
issue.
E-mail from Lieutenant Colonel John J. Michels, Jr., U.S. Air Force Reserve, to Randall D.
Katz (Apr. 4, 2001) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). The author wishes to thank Lt. Col.
John Michels for his assistance and guidance with this Note.
165. United States v. Chadwell, 36 C.M.R. 741, 747-48 (1965).
166. Id. at 748.
167. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 2 (noting that many members of the armed serv-
ices do not share DOD’s faith in the vaccine).
168. See id. at 45.
169. The trust issue is exemplified by concerns of service members. See, e.g., Laura
Laughlin, Shot to Hell: Mandatory Participation in the Military’s Anthrax Vaccine Program
Pushes Plunger on Medical Controversy, PHOENIX NEW TIMES, Jan. 27, 2000 (giving the
illustration of Joe, an Arizona Air National Guard Member, who struggled with the question of
whether to submit to vaccination: “Joe says about 40 members of his Guard unit—including a
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GAO studies have shown that fear of the anthrax vaccine is
causing service members to leave the armed forces at a significant
rate.170 Those who do not leave face a difficult choice between submit-
ting to vaccination, and possibly risking their health, or facing disci-
plinary action. Major Sonnie Bates and hundreds of others have de-
cided the stakes were much too high for them to risk their health—
they did not trust the government.171 Soldiers’ fears about the safety
and efficacy of the vaccine are underscored by the DOD’s past
failures to release information harmful to the Department. An
example is the No Gun Ri massacre, in which American troops shot
unarmed Korean civilians in the first month of the Korean War.172
The Pentagon denied the killings for decades, and admitted to the
massacre only recently after an investigation was spurred by an
Associated Press report detailing the incident.173 Similarly, the adverse
safety and efficacy information on the anthrax vaccine may be the
latest example of the Pentagon’s deny-and-then-begrudgingly-admit
policy. Service members have a right to be concerned. A recent
editorial in the Air Force Times called for an end to mandatory
anthrax vaccinations: “The anthrax vaccine inoculation program has
sewn [sic] dissent in the ranks and added to the mistrust some troops
harbor for their commanders. . . . [Q]uestions persist about the
couple of his friends—quit rather than begin the series of shots. And he expects more to follow
when the vaccines are doled out to everyone.”), available at http://www.phoenixnewtimes.com/
issues/2000-01-27/ feature.html (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
170. Supra note 22 and accompanying text.
171. Air Force Captain John Buck, the first military physician to refuse the anthrax vaccine,
Funk, supra note 15, at 16, wrote, “[A]s a military physician, I have a responsibility to do all I
can to protect the rights of the troops.” E-mail from Captain John Buck to Randall D. Katz, su-
pra note 15. Captain Buck refused to take the vaccine because of the lack of adequate informa-
tion, production issues, and potential long-term health effects. Id. Captain Buck also expressed
that he was concerned about the production facilities for the anthrax vaccine. Id. These facilities
are also at the center of the anthrax controversy. Bioport, the maker of the vaccine, has a facility
in Michigan that has a “checkered regulatory history.” HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 3.
172. See Joohee Cho & Doug Struck, U.S. Statement on Killings Disappoints South Koreans,
WASH. POST, Jan. 12, 2001, at A18 (describing how Koreans regarded President Clinton’s
statement of regret for the incident as “incomplete and too late”); Roberto Suro & Thomas E.
Ricks, Clinton to Express Korean War Regret, WASH. POST, Jan. 11, 2001, at A7 (noting that
President Clinton plans to issue a written statement of regret for the incident).
173. Suro & Ricks, supra note 172, at A7. The 2000 Pulitzer Prize–winning series of articles
on the No Gun Ri Massacre was written by Charles Hanley et al., and can be found at The
Pulitzer Prize Website. See Pulitzer Prize Winners: Bridge at No Gun Ri, The Pulitzer Board, at
http://www.pulitzer.org/year/2000/investigative-reporting/works (last visited Apr. 5, 2001) (on
file with the Duke Law Journal).
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. . [Q]uestions persist about the quality, efficacy, safety and legality of
the shots.”174
Numerous pieces of legislation have been introduced regarding
AVIP, with remedies ranging from halting the program to requiring
informed consent. Three bills were before the 106th Congress. The
first was H.R. 2548, the “Department of Defense Anthrax Vaccina-
tion Moratorium Act,” which proposed suspending AVIP until the
vaccine is determined to be safe.175 The “American Military Health
Protection Act,” H.R. 2543, would have made AVIP voluntary until
the FDA approves a new vaccine or reduced dosage.176 Similar legisla-
tion, H.R. 3460, would have prohibited the DOD from waiving in-
formed consent for an IND or a drug not approved for its applied
use.177
Others outside the military and Congress are moving to halt the
program. In fact, Connecticut Attorney General Richard Blumenthal
recently wrote a letter to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld
urging him to make AVIP voluntary or halt the program.178 Attorney
General Blumenthal remarked in his letter, “Unfortunately, and di-
rectly contrary to law, the [vaccine] is being administered. . . . In ef-
fect, the military is forcing its personnel to serve as human guinea pigs
for an unlicensed drug that has not been proven to be safe or effec-
tive.”179
It is clear from the plethora of press reports, personal stories, and
congressional testimony that the DOD needs to regain the trust of its
service members with regard to anthrax vaccinations.180 If Congress
halts the program on its own, the DOD will not regain the trust it has
lost. The DOD should regain trust by making the system work: mili-
tary judges should examine the merits of the cases and make a fair ju-
dicial evaluation, and the DOD should halt the program to conduct
more research on the long-term health effects and the vaccine’s effec-
tiveness. Additionally, the DOD should cause the current vaccine to
174. Editorial, AIR FORCE TIMES, Jan. 8, 2001, at 44.
175. H.R. 2548, 106th Cong. §§ 3-4 (1999).
176. H.R. 2543, 106th Cong. § 3 (1999).
177. H.R. 3460, 106th Cong. § 2 (1999).
178. Letter from Richard Blumenthal, Attorney General, State of Connecticut, to Donald
Rumsfeld, Secretary, U.S. Department of Defense 1 (Mar. 21, 2001) (on file with the Duke Law
Journal). The United Kingdom has made its anthrax innoculation program voluntary. Id. at 14.
179. Id. at 2.
180. See supra notes 13-22 and accompanying text (describing concerns with the vaccination
program).
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undergo the approval process for its use against inhalation anthrax.
An unidentified DOD spokesman eloquently summarized the trust
issue at a briefing on AVIP:
I think medicine is based on trust. If for whatever reason, in any in-
dividual’s mind he loses trust in his medicine, in his doctor, or he
loses trust in his government, then those sorts of feelings will fall on
more fertile ground. . . . Our job is to regain that trust and make sure
that our message is clear, that we are protecting our people, that we
are doing everything we possibly can to make sure we are not
harming them with the thing we give them to protect them.181
AVIP is analogous to “friendly fire” on American service mem-
bers. Although the DOD certainly is not intentionally trying to harm
its troops, and AVIP was born out of a genuine concern for American
well-being and safety, the risks associated with the vaccine are largely
unknown. The DOD must stop the friendly fire “shots” and regain
service members’ trust.182 The ultimate question, at the heart of the
anthrax vaccination controversy, is whether friendly fire is more dan-
gerous than enemy fire.
181. Michels & Smith, supra note 47 (quoting an “Unidentified Defense Department
Spokesman”).
182. Maybe the problem is solving itself. Due to the manufacturer’s problems producing the
vaccine, the Pentagon has recently drastically cut back AVIP:
Under the change . . . only troops that will serve in the Gulf for at least 30
days will receive the shot, [former] Pentagon spokesman Kenneth Bacon
said. Forces deployed in South Korea, the only others now receiving the
vaccine under a program curtailed to preserve scarce supplies, no longer
will be vaccinated.
Pauline Jelinek, Anthrax Vaccine Program to Dwindle, AP ONLINE, Dec. 1, 2000, at 1, available
at 2000 WL 30317307. This could be the DOD’s opportunity for a graceful exit.
